Digital watermarking has been recently proposed as the mean for copyright protection of multimedia data. Many of existing watermarking schemes focused on the robust means to mark an image invisibly without really addressing the ends of these schemes. This paper rst discusses some scenarios in which many current watermarking schemes fail to resolve the rightful ownership of an image. The key problems are then identi ed, and some crucial requirements for a valid invisible watermark detection are discussed. In particular, we show that, for the particular application of resolving rightful ownership using invisible watermarks, it might be crucial to require that the original image not be directly involved in the watermark detection process. A general framework for validly detecting the invisible watermarks is then proposed. Some requirements on the claimed signature/watermarks to be used for detection are discussed to prevent the existence of any counterfeit scheme. The optimal detection strategy within the framework is derived. We show the e ectiveness of this technique based on some visual-model-based watermark encoding schemes. 
Introduction
The rapid growth of digital imagery, the increasingly easy access to digital media, and the increasingly powerful tools available for manipulating digital media have made media security a very important issue. Digital watermarks have been proposed recently as the means for intellectual property right protection of multimedia data. Digital watermarking is a process of embedding information (or signature) directly into the media data by making small modi cations to them. With the detection/extraction of the signature from the watermarked media data, it has been claimed that digital watermarks can be used to identify the rightful owner, the intended recipients, as well as the authenticity of a media data 1, 2].
We shall discuss watermarking of image data in this paper, although the general idea presented here is also applicable to other forms of multimedia data. The watermarks can be perceptually visible or invisible. We focus on invisible watermarks in this paper. For more information about visible watermarks, see 3] . In general, there are two most common requirements of invisible watermarks. The watermarks should be perceptually invisible, i.e., they should not interfere with the media being protected. They should also be robust to common signal processing and intentional attacks. Particularly, the watermark should still be detectable/extractable even after common signal processing operations have been applied to the watermarked image. These include digital-to-analog and analog-to-digital conversions, resampling, ltering, compression, geometric transformation, cropping, etc. In addition, the watermark should be resistant to intentional attacks that attempt to remove the watermarks. Furthermore, the watermarking system should guarantee that no counterfeit watermark is possible to generate 2, 4] . It should be noted that the two basic requirements, imperceptibility and robustness to signal processing, con ict with each other. In fact, one of the fundamental problem in digital watermarking is to achieve a good balance between these two requirements.
Early research 5, 6, 7] on digital watermarking concentrates on the imperceptibility without considering the robustness requirement. Recently much work has been devoted to designing robust watermarking schemes 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11] . Perceptual models have also been incorporated to achieve the best tradeo between perceptual invisibility and robustness to signal processing 9, 10, 11] . In general, the watermarking schemes can be classi ed into two categories: spatial domain approach or frequency domain approach. It is believed that frequency domain approach has some advantages because most of the signal processing operations can be well characterized in the frequency domain, and many good perceptual models are developed in the frequency domain 10, 11] . Many proposed watermarking schemes 2, 9, 10] require the original unwatermarked image for the watermark detection. We notice that some other schemes 1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] that are able to detect the watermark bits without access to the original unwatermarked image have been proposed recently. However, most of these schemes primarily address the general problem of data hiding, rather than a speci c application such as resolving the rightful ownership. As will be shown in Section 3, these schemes generally can not be directly used to resolve the rightful ownership. Some of them 16] use a spatial domain approach, and estimate the original image data based on some neighborhood averaging of the test image, and heuristically estimate the decision threshold based on the test image data. Some others 12, 13, 14, 15 ] use a frequency domain approach. Although most of these schemes use some kinds of correlating detector for watermark detection, their detection performances are usually not optimal and the physical meaning of their detector output value is not clearly addressed. An exception is the independently proposed scheme presented in 13] where some analysis is given regarding the detection performance. In this paper, we extend our previous work in 17] and propose an optimal statistical detection scheme without access to the original image. As opposed to some other schemes 12, 14, 15, 16] , our approach is able to quantify the con dence of the detection based on some mathematical analysis. Our framework is more general than that of 1, 13] . The proposed scheme is particularly useful for the application of resolving the rightful ownership.
As pointed out in 4], many of existing watermarking schemes \focused on the robust means to mark an image invisibly without really addressing the ends of invisible watermarking schemes". It is shown in 4] that many current invisible watermarking schemes (especially those that use original images for watermark detection) can not resolve rightful ownership of any image watermarked with multiple ownership signatures. In a follow-up paper 18], the authors of 4] also pointed out some potential counterfeit attacks to some previously proposed watermarking schemes that do not require original images for watermark detection. They suggested to use a watermark that results from a one-way hash of the original image (possibly with additional ownership information). Smith and Comiskey 12] have also pointed out, although without much analysis, that \the proof value of such a watermark (using an original-image escrow scheme) is questionable". In this paper, we further discuss some scenarios in which many current watermarking schemes (using original images for detection or not) fail to resolve the rightful ownership. We identify the key problems and propose a viable general solution. In particular, we show that, for the particular application of resolving rightful ownership using invisible watermarks, it might be crucial to require that the original image not be directly involved in the watermark detection process. This requirement is particularly necessary for a class of watermarking schemes that quantify the detection con dence based on the measure of the false alarm detection probability. A general framework for validly and e ectively detecting the invisible watermarks without using the original image is then proposed. Some requirements on the claimed signature are discussed to prevent the existence of any counterfeit scheme. Particularly, we show that the key/signature used to generate the watermark sequence has to be subject to some constraints. We therefore propose to impose the requirement of using a registered owner identi cation (ID) or a meaningful signature as the key to generate, preferrably through a certi ed one-way mapping, the watermark sequence. The optimal detection strategy within the proposed framework is derived. When combined with some visual-model-based watermark encoding schemes, the proposed scheme is shown to be robust enough for resolving the dispute of rightful ownership.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some scenarios in which many current watermarking schemes fail to resolve the rightful ownership. A general framework for resolving this problem is proposed in Section 3. Section 4 presents a case study based on two visual-model-based watermark encoding schemes. Some concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
Invalidating claims of ownerships
We rst describe a generalized formulation of a class of current invisible watermarking schemes 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 4]. Fig. 1 , which is similar to what have been described in 4, 10], illustrates both the watermark encoding and decoding processes.
Given the original image I, one generates the signature S, and then embeds S into I to create a watermarked image I 0 which should be visually close to I. In general, the embedding process could be an arbitrary function of the original image I and the signature S. However, in many watermarking schemes 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11], the embedding operator is simply the addition operator. In watermark detection, given the test image X assumed to have been marked and whose ownership is to be determined, one rst extracts the signature S 0 from X, usually making use of the original image I. Then S 0 is compared to the original signature S. The similarity index is then compared to a threshold T to determine if the test image is a watermarked version of the original image.
It is a common view that invisible watermarking schemes may be used to protect the rights of image owners. This is because the signature extracted from the watermarked images will match the signature of the owner. However, it has been shown in 4] that a counterfeit watermarking scheme can allow multiple claims of ownerships. In other words, \the true owner of an image can no longer argue his claim based only on the digital watermarks that he invisibly embedded in the image, as others can engineer an equal amount of evidence that they too own the image" 4].
The key point presented in 4] is that the watermark detection mechanism is based on the relationship between the original image I, and the test image X, a potentially watermarked version of I. For example, the di erence between image I and image X, obtained by pixelwise subtraction, can be considered as the potential watermarks inserted. If both the owner of the original image and the current possessor of the test image know the relationship, they can both claim that the other image is a watermarked version of his image. Of course the possessor of image X is not supposed to know the relationship established by the owner of the original image I. The possessor of image X should also not be able to obtain the relationship by analyzing both images, because the true original image (image I in this case ) is not available except to the true owner. Therefore it seems that the possessor of X will not be able to claim that I is a watermarked version of X. However, the possessor of X can actually create a counterfeit original X 0 , which could also be visually close to image I, by subtracting his own signature S X from X such that Enc(X 0 ; S X ) = X holds, where Enc(X 0 ; S X ) denotes the watermarking (in particular, through addition) of X 0 with the signature S X . Now the possessor of X knows exactly the relationship between X and X 0 . For X 0 , as far as Signature S X is concerned, I and X are statistically equivalent. So the relationship of X with X 0 carries over to I. Now the possessor of X can claim that he knows a relationship between I and X 0 , and therefore claim that he is the rightful owner of the \original" image X 0 , and both I and X are watermarked versions of X 0 . This results in two \original" images I and X 0 . Nobody other than the owner of I and the possessor of X 0 knows the truth. This scenario is referred to as Scenario 1 in the sequel.
In fact, in addition to Scenario 1 that was presented in 4], there exists a simpler and yet valid scenario (Scenario 2) in which rightful ownership can not be resolved. The possessor of X can invalidate the claim of ownership by the owner of I even without generating the third image X 0 . He can simply argue that X is the original image (into which, unfortunately, he did not embed any watermark), and that the owner of I somehow took X and subtracted his signature to create I. Of course, in this case, the owner of I knows the relationship between I and X whereas the possessor of X does not. Since the detection mechanism is not able to signify whether or not the claimed \original" image is a fake one (e.g., possibly generated from the other one a posteriori), there is no way for the jury to decide who is guilty.
In the above two scenarios, it is implicitly assumed that the original image I is not registered with a central authority for copyright protection. In fact, even if the original image I is properly registered through current copyrighting mechanisms, there is still di culty in resolving the dispute over the ownership. For instance, in Scenario 2, the possessor of X can still claim that X is the original image which, unfortunately, was not registered (it is impractical to require every image to be registered), and that the owner of I took X and subtracted his signature to create I, and then registered I with the central authority. As long as image X looks very good (like an original image), it is very hard, if not impossible, for the jury to decide which one is the true original image. Similar arguments are applicable to Scenario 1 too. In fact, as pointed out in 4], it has been recognized for quite some time that current copyright laws are inadequate for dealing with digital data which can be easily created, copied and manipulated.
Realizing that the problem in Scenario 1 comes from the invertible (additive, in particular,) nature of the watermark encoding process, Craver et. al . 4] suggested that, from legal point of view, certain requirements such as that the watermarking schemes should not be invertible (see the de nition in 4]), should be imposed in order to establish rightful ownership through invisible watermarks. However, within the framework of Fig. 1 , we believe it is generally very hard, if not impossible, to design a non-invertible (with rigorous proof) encoding process which results in watermarks that can be later extracted.
Based on the analysis in Scenarios 1 and 2, we believe that the real problem lies mainly in the watermark detection process, not in the watermark encoding process. The true owner should be able to detect the watermarks without using a second image (of which the authenticity is also questionable). If a second image (potentially the original image) will be used in the watermark detection process, the ownership claimer should prove to the court that this image is not a fake version. This, however, is essentially what should be done for the claim of the rightful ownership. For example, let us assume one uses the detection scheme of Fig.  1(b) . A large output value of the similarity measure operator only suggests that S highly correlates with S 0 , where S 0 depends on the di erence of two images I and X. In other words, it only suggests that one image is generated by embedding S to (or subtracting S from) the other image, under the assumption that S is generated independent of any image. For the application of identifying the buyer of an image, the original image I is authentic. Therefore a large output of Fig. 1(b) signi es that X contains the potential signature S that identi es the buyer. However, for resolving rightful ownership, nothing can be assumed about the originality of these two images without proof. Of course, a small output value of Fig. 1(b) does not help in resolving the rightful ownership. A large output value of Fig. 1(b) , on the other hand, only signi es that one image is generated by embedding S to (or subtracting S from) the other image. It, however, does not identify which image is the original one. The owner of I can claim that he embedded S to I and generated X. But the possessor of X can also claim that X is the original one and that the owner of I took X and subtracted S to generate I (Scenario 2). Therefore the detector output does not have the desired physical meaning of quantifying the false alarm detection probability of an ownership claim.
Therefore, the original rightful ownership problem is still unsolved. Let us assume the output of Fig. 1(b) is fairly large, which may suggest that almost surely one image is generated by embedding S to (or subtracting S from) the other image. Now the original problem reduces to the problem of identifying which image is the source of the other one. One hypothesis is: I is the original one (X is generated by embedding S to I); the other hypothesis is: X is the original one (I is generated by subtracting S from X). The only solution now is to make the decision by correlating S with each of these two images. Of course, the owner of I will choose to correlate S with X and hope to get a large output value, which indicates that X contains S with high probability, or equivalently, the false alarm detection probability is very small. Note that correlating S with I may output a very small value, which might suggest that I is the original image. However, it is not clear what the physical meaning (in terms of quantifying the detection con dence) of this small value is. In other words, this value does not contribute anything to the quanti cation of the detection con dence under the second hypothesis. To be more concrete, let us denote the event of foutput of correlating S with X is larger than a threshold T 1 , under the second hypothesisg as A, and the event of foutput of correlating S with I is less than a threshold T 2 , under the second hypothesisg as B. Then P AB] = P A]P B=A] P A]. However, P B=A] could be as large as 1, due to the exibility that a counterfeit attacker has to play the trick. Therefore, looking at the correlation between S and I does not help to quantify the detection con dence. It is reasonable to conclude that, by looking at the correlation between S and X alone, one nds the upper bound of the false alarm detection probability.
The non-invertible requirement proposed in 4] tries to establish that the second image presented is not a fake one. However, this raises another issue: you have to prove to the court that your scheme is actually \non-invertible", which seems to be fairly di cult. For example, as suggested in 4], one may choose to generate a sequence of random numbers which depend on the original image I. More speci cally, the seed of the random number generator can be a one-way function F of the original image I. With this constraint, it is hoped we can convince the jury that the claimed \original" image can not be generated after the fake watermarks have been generated. This strategy of creating a \chicken and egg" scenario, however, does not necessarily solve the problem. Suppose the claimed watermark insertion process can be described as X = I + w(F(I)) + N, where w( ) is another function (e.g., a random number generator) which maps the seed to the watermarks, and N is some noise. Then you have to prove to the court that it is impossible to map both I and X (more precisely, X + , where is any noise image) to the same seed, i.e., F(I) 6 = F(X + ) should always hold for any . However, this is generally not true. This can be easily seen if we assume F is a linear system. Under this assumption, if w(F(I))+ N + is in the null space of F, then F(X + ) = F(I). Note that it is generally true that the null space of F is not empty because F is a mapping from large dimension to one dimension. Hence, in this case, I = X ? w(F(I)) ? N = (X + ) ? w(F(X + )) ? N ? , which suggests that I could be a fake version of X. On the other hand, it is also realized that this counterfeit attack (i.e., nding a fake \original" I such that F(I) = F(X + ) for some ) is generally very di cult (but probably not impossible) to perform, given F is a one-way function.
Nevertheless, the above suggested insertion scheme does not necessarily guarantee that no counterfeit scheme exists. No matter what the function F is, there is always another problem that can not be solved. Given any test image X, the counterfeit attacker does not even need to nd a fake original image I such that F(I) = F(X + ) holds for some . He only needs to nd a fake original image I such that w(F(I)) has certain degree of correlation with a certain random sequence w(F(X)). For example, a counterfeit attacker can always subtract a random sequence S f (generated from some seed) from a test image X and generate a fake \original" image. Then he slightly and continuously modi es the fake \original" image , each time generating through F an \original-image-dependent" seed which is then used to generate a fake random sequence S 0 f . In this way, the counterfeit attacker can computationally search for a S 0 f that has some potentially high correlation with S f . We will show the amount of e ort that needed to search for a random sequence that has certain degree of correlation with any given (random) sequence in Section 3.3. Now the counterfeit attacker has a fake \original-image-dependent" random sequence that has some potentially high correlation with the extracted random sequence (a potentially distorted version of S f ), thus claims the test image X is his watermarked image. Therefore, with enough computation power, it is almost surely one can generate a fake \original" image and a fake \original-image-dependent" random sequence to create an ownership dispute for any given test image. We should also note that, even if the original image is not to be used in the detection process, similar problem exists. Therefore, some requirements on the claimed signature S should also be imposed in order to eliminate the possibility of playing some tricks with S, as will be discussed in Section 3.
3 Valid detection of watermarks without using the original image
The arguments for invalidating claims of ownerships presented in last section are applicable to most current digital watermarking schemes such as those in 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11]. To make the above counterfeit attacks infeasible, we believe that some additional careful requirements, or standardization of, the watermarking schemes should be imposed in order to resolve the rightful ownership, as previously suggested in 4]. One of the crucial requirements might be that the watermarks should be detected without using a second image (usually the original image). By imposing the requirement of detecting watermarks in the test image without using a second image, a counterfeit attacker will not be able to make any meaningful arguments about his ability to detect watermarks in the true original image that is not watermarked and is locked away from other people by the true owner. Therefore, Scenario 1 is invalid. Scenario 2 is also invalid because only the true owner can prove the nature of watermarks in a test image. The capability of detecting/extracting the watermark information without access to the original image is also desirable for some other applications such as DVD copy protection where the original image may not be available for watermark detection. As will be discussed in Section 3.3, there should also be some requirements on the procedure for generating the claimed watermark sequence to be used for detection.
Detecting watermarks with a quantitative measure
Although the signature in a watermarked image is perceptually invisible, it should be \sta-tistically visible". In other words, it should be detectable using some statistical techniques without looking at other images. Fig. 2 shows a general architecture of our proposed watermarking system that we believe is e ective for resolving rightful ownership. To be more concrete, we focus on the so-called feature-based 4] watermarking schemes 2, 9, 10, 11] in which an i.i.d. (independent identical distributed) pseudo random sequence fS 1i g is embed- 
The watermarked image I 0 can be constructed based on the modi ed feature set fI 0 i g and other unmodi ed data.
In the watermark detector, the test feature set fX i g are rst derived from the test image X, and then correlated with a signature S 2 (also denoted as fS 2i g) which is usually a pseudo random sequence. S 2 should be highly correlated with S 1 , but may not be exactly the same. Choice of S 2 can be optimized to improve the detector performance, as will be discussed in Section 3.2. The correlator output q is compared to a threshold T to determine if the test image contains the claimed watermarks. Detection of the watermarks is accomplished via the hypothesis testing: H 0 : X i = I i + N i not contain the claimed watermark H 1 : X i = I i + G i (I i )S 1i + N i contain the claimed watermark (2) where N i is noise, possibly resulted from some signal processing such as compression, lowpass ltering, etc.. The correlating detector outputs the test statistic q
where Y i = X i S 2i , n is the size of the feature set fX i g, M y and V 2 y are the sample mean and the sample variance of Y i , given respectively by
Assume that the sequence fY i g is stationary and at least l-dependent 1 19] for a nite positive integer l, and that fS 2i g is zero mean and uncorrelated with the original image I.
Then under Hypothesis H 0 , the test statistic q follows a zero mean student distribution with n?1 degrees of freedom 20]. For large n, q is approximately a normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance, i.e., q N(0; 1) . Note that it is not necessary to require fS 2i g to be normal distributed in order to have this property hold, as opposed to the case discussed in 2] for the proof of a similar property.
Let E( ) denote the expectation operator. Under Hypothesis H 1 and for large n, it is easy to show that q follows a normal distribution N(m; 1), where
Note that E(N i S 2i ) may not be equal to zero, since N i could have some correlation with S 2i . For example, if the feature points are some DCT coe cients, then the noise introduced by zeroing out some of the coe cients (due to, e.g., coarse quantization) is highly correlated with S 1i , and thus may potentially have high correlation with S 2i .
To determine if a test image contains the claimed watermarks, the output q is compared to a threshold T. If q > T, the test image is declared to have been signed with the claimed signature fS 1i g. Otherwise it is not. The threshold T that minimizes the total detection errors (both Type 1 error -accept the existence of a signature under H 0 , and Type 2 errorreject the existence of a signature under H 1 ) is T = m 2 . In practice, however, nobody other than the true owner knows the value of m. With this consideration, it appears that what is accountable is only the false alarm detection probability, that is, the probability of error detection by accepting the existence of a signature when it does not exist. Refer to Table 1 for the false alarm detection probability as a function of the threshold T.
Threshold T P err (q > T) 3 0.0013 5 2.86E-7 6
9.86E-10 8
6.22E-16 10 7.62E-24 12
1.77E-33 Table 1 : False alarm detection probability P err .
Optimal choice of S 2 and its validity
The choice of S 2 has a great impact on the detection validity and the detection capability. For a valid claim of ownership, S 2 should satisfy some constraints. First, the creation process of S 2 should be independent of any image. This is to guarantee that S 2 is not obtained by analyzing the test image, but instead created by the true owner when the watermarks were inserted. We will propose a way to guarantee that S 2 is created independent of the test image in Section 3.3. Second, to determine the threshold T for a given false alarm detection probability without access to the original image, it is necessary that the mean value of S 2i is zero. With these two constraints, under Hypothesis H 0 where the test image is not watermarked, the expected output value of q is alway zero. We call a random sequence that satis es the above two constraints a valid correlating signature. Of course, for the bene t of the owner, Eq. (5) suggests that S 2 should be chosen to be closely correlated with S 1 . This is to make sure that under Hypothesis H 1 , the output value q will be signi cantly deviated from 0. For example, if S 1 is zero mean and has equal probability to be larger or less than zero, two simple choices for S 2 are: 1) S 2i = S 1i (Choice 1) and 2) S 2i = sign(S 1i ) (Choice 2). In the latter case, the detection scheme is almost equivalent to the scheme presented in 1]. In 1], pixels in the spatial domain are randomly divided into two sets of equal size. Some small values are added to one set while the other set remain unchanged. Then the di erence of the mean pixel values of these two set is used to detect the watermarks. Within the framework of the proposed system shown in Fig. 2 and their watermark sequences are probably generated from some seeds using a random number generator. However, the importance of the requirement of not using original images for detection and the requirements on the procedure for generating the claimed watermark sequence for the particular application of resolving rightful ownership were not recognized in those works. We will show that the choice of S 2 will greatly a ect the performance of the watermark detector. For simplicity, let us rst assume that G i ( ) is independent of the value of I i . We will relax this assumption later. Since S 2i has zero mean, we have, under Hypothesis H 1 and for large n,
Note that we neglect the noise N i in the above derivation. In general, for perceptually invisible watermarks, E(G 2 i S 2 1i S 2 2i ) and M 2 y are much smaller than E(I 2 i S 2 2i ). The third term in the last equation is also relatively small, especially considering that E(G i S 1i S 2 2i ) is usually close to zero. For example, if the distribution of S 1i is an even function and S 2i = S 1i , then E(G i S 1i S 2 2i ) = 0. Note that we make use of the fact that G i and S 1i are independent. Therefore V 2
Since we assume that S 2i is uncorrelated with I i , we have V 2
y ' E(I 2 i )E(S 2 2i ). Then Eq. (5) reduces to
The above derivation parrallels that of matched ltering where the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality is used. The equality holds when S 2i = kG i S 1i , where k is a positive constant. Note that the larger the value of m, the smaller the probability of error detection. Therefore, under the assumption that G i ( ) is independent of I i , the choice of S 2i = kG i S 1i is a valid correlating signature, and is actually the optimal correlating signature for e ective detection. Let's look at a special case where G i is a constant c, and S 1i is N(0; 
Even though the equality holds when S 2i = kG i (I i )S 1i , it usually will not give the optimal solution because the right hand side of Eq. (12) still depends on S 2i . If G i ( ) can be written as a product of two terms, i.e., G i (I i ) = U i (I i )W i , where W i is independent of I i and U i is a function of I i , then with the constraint that S 2i is not correlated with I i and U i (I i ),
The optimal choice of S 2i , under the constraint that S 2i is not correlated with I i and U i (I i ), should be kS 1i W i . Note that, depending on how G i (I i ) is factorized, we may have di erent output values of m. An example of G i ( ) will be discussed in Section 4 where G i ( ) can be written as a product of two terms 10, 11] . One is an image independent frequency threshold. The other one, which depends on the value of I i , accounts for the luminance sensitivity and contrast masking e ect of the human visual system.
Additional requirements on S 2
Although the watermark detection problem for resolving rightful ownership resembles conventional signal detection problems, they di er in that watermark detection is subject to counterfeit attacks. In other words, in conventional signal detection, the goal is to detect the existence of certain signal; whereas in watermark detection, it is also necessary to make sure that the claimed watermark signal to be detected is not obtained by analyzing the test image, but instead was created independent of any image by the owner. Unfortunately, many existing watermarking systems did not recognize this di erence. In fact, the false alarm detection probability discussed in Section 3.1 makes sense only if only one sample random sequence S 2 that generated from certain seed is tested (one trial). If many trials are allowed, then a counterfeit attacker can always pick the sequence that results in the largest detector output value. In other words, if a counterfeit attacker is allowed to claim that any selected key/signature is his key/signature, he can computationally search for a correlating signature S 2 (generated from the key/signature through a random number generator) that results in an output q signi cantly deviated from zero. In fact, the amount of e ort needed to nd such a correlating signature can be quanti ed, as discussed in the following.
Note that given any test image and any independently generated correlating signature S 2 , the detector output value q is a random variable with N(0; 1) distribution. Given any threshold T, the probability of the event that q is greater than T is actually the false alarm detection probability with respective to T (see Table 1 ). For example, if the threshold T = 5, then the probability of the event that the detector output q is greater than 5 is in the order of 10 ?7 . Now let us see, on the average, how many trials a counterfeit attacker has to conduct before he nds an output value q that is greater than a xed threshold T. Denote the probability of the event that q is greater than T for a single trial as Perr(T). Denote M T as the number of trials conducted before an output value q greater than T is found. Then, (15) Therefore, if the detection threshold T is not too large, for example, T = 5 which, in fact, corresponds to a fairly small false alarm detection probability (in the order of 10 ?7 ), then it is possible to computationally playing around with the seed of a random number generator to search for an output q that is greater than T. For example, on the average, a counterfeit attacker can nd a seed, after about 3:5 10 6 trials, that results in an output q greater than 5 on any image, and therefore can claim that any image is his property. We have done experiments to verify this. For example, for the 256 256 \lenna" image, it takes about 117 ms to do one trial of detection using a Sun Ultra 2 workstation. We applied the detection scheme to the 256 256 original unwatermarked \lenna" image. The detector output a value of -5.15 and a value of 5.54 at the 232811th and the 2688680th trials (after about 88 hours), respectively. Note that making the detection process more complex will increase the di culty of such an attack, but is generally not an e ective solution. This scenario suggests that, without constraints on the exibility of choosing the seeds or the claimed signature, given enough computing power, almost surely anyone can claim he has the ownership of any image. For the same reasons, the original-image escrow schemes, whether or not the watermarks are original-image dependent, are inevitably vulnerable to counterfeit attacks.
We therefore propose to impose two requirements on the generation process of the claimed watermark sequence S 2 . First, only a registered owner ID number that is acquired from a central authority or a meaningful signature (make sense to the jury, e.g., \Princeton University") can be used as a valid key S 0 to generate the watermark suquence S 2 . Second, we propose to use a certified one-way deterministicfunction H to map such a key to a pseudo random sequence S 1 (and then to S 2 ). If a meaningful signature is to be used, it should be meaningful enough in the sense that it is obvious that it is not generated a posteriori by arbitrarily changing part of the signature. These requirements are established in order to preclude the possibility of doing exhaustive search (though sometimes computationally expensive) for a large detector output value by playing around with the seed of a random number generator.
With the proposed one-way determinsitic mapping of a meaningful signature or a registered owner ID, even though it is possible for a counterfeit attacker to nd one sample of correlating signature S 2 that results in a large q, it is impossible for him to nd a meaningful signature or a registered owner ID S 0 that can be mapped to S 2 by a certi ed one-way deterministic function. Hence, no counterfeit attack is possible, and in theory, the detector output truly signi es the probability of false alarm detection. Therefore, the true owner can sign, for example, the name \Princeton University" (S 0 ) and map it to a pseudo random sequence S 1 , and then embed watermarks using S 1 . In the court, the owner can provide the name \Princeton University" and the certi ed one-way deterministic function H, and show a large output value of q by detecting the watermarks directly on the test image. Note that to make the solution most e ective, both the signature S 0 and the one-way deterministic function should be registered/certi ed. We notice that the authors of 4] also discussed, in some follow-up papers 18, 21], potential counterfeit attacks to some previously proposed watermarking schemes that do not require original images for watermark detection. Unfortunately, their conclusion is again that \to avoid counterfeit attacks to schemes that do not require the original for detection purpose, one would need the watermark that results from a one-way hash of the source (original) image (possibly with combinations of the owner's identi cation) " 21] . Based on the above discussion, we believe the watermark sequence should not depend on the \original" image, especially for the class of watermarking systems that use false alarm detection probability to quantify the detection con dence; rather, there should be some more constraints, e.g., using a potentially registered meaningful signature and a certi ed one-way function. The certi ed one-way function in our system makes it impossible for a counterfeit attacker to inversely map a desired seed to a meaningful signature or registered owner ID. Note that while it is generally impractical to require each image to be registered, it is reasonable to require each person to register an owner ID and, potentially, to have the one-way function certi ed.
It is worthwhile to point out that it is also possible to directly extract some meaningful copyright information such as meaningful text or company logo images from the test image to prove the ownership 22]. In this case, it seems more di cult for a counterfeit attacker to extract meaningful watermark information from a test image than to search for a fake watermark sequence that has certain degree of correlation with the test image, by playing around with the seed of a random number generator. Therefore, for these types of schemes, it is not quite clear yet if it is necessary to impose the constraint of mapping a registered meaningful signature to the seed of the (standard/certi ed) random number generator. However, it should be noted the trade-o here is that those schemes that directly extract meaningful watermark information (e.g., a logo image) are generally much less robust than the schemes that detect the existence (essentially one bit information) of the claimed watermark sequence based on the measure of false alarm detection probability.
For resolving rightful ownership, there are two types of attacks. One is a false claim of ownership. The other one is the attempt to remove the watermark. The rst type of attack has been addressed. For the second type, without knowing the keys (in our case, the keys are the meaningful signature or registered owner ID, and the one-way deterministic mapping), it is almost impossible for an attacker to remove the watermarks. The constraint of using a meaningful signature in some sense reduces the search range for an attacker. However, if the one-way deterministic function is kept private, it is equivalently impossible for an attacker to remove the watermarks. If, on the other hand, the one-way deterministic function is required to be chosen from a standard library which is also accessible by an attacker, then the search range for an attacker is reduced. One remedy might be to allow the one-way deterministic function to have exactly one controlling parameter, and to require a registered user identi cation number for each owner as the controlling parameter of the one-way function. Assuming that the registered user identi cation number is not known to public, it will be very hard for an attacker to remove the watermark. We shall note that another alternative is to use a registered user identi cation number as the only key for the watermarking system. However, a reasonable concern is that then all the ownerships depend entirely on a key that is in the hand of a third party (legal authority), with no private control by the true owner. It should be noted that there is a distinct di erence between the attack of counterfeiting a watermark and that of removing a watermark. For removing a watermark, an attacker may be able to do exhaustive search to nd a sequence that has certain degree of correlation with a watermarked image. However, the attacker will never be sure that he has found the true watermarks, since there are plenty of sequences that may have certain degree of correlation with the watermarked image.
Case study: detection of visual-model-based watermarks
To illustrate the e ectiveness of the proposed watermarking system, we start with the visualmodel-based watermark encoding schemes proposed in 10, 11] , and apply the proposed detection scheme to detect the watermarks. Two perceptually based watermarking schemes were proposed in 11]. One is based on block-based DCT transform framework. The other is based on multiresolution wavelet framework which generally yields better performance. We will present our test results based on the DCT based perceptual watermark encoding scheme 10]. Better performance is expected with the wavelet based perceptual watermark encoding scheme 11].
In the DCT-based perceptual watermarking scheme, the image is rst divided into nonoverlapped 8 8 blocks. Then each block is DCT transformed. A frequency threshold value is derived based on measurements of speci c viewing conditions for each DCT basis function, which results in an image-independent 8 (1). We will refer to this scheme as Scheme I. Scheme I only makes use of the property that human eyes have di erent sensitivities to di erent frequencies. On the other hand, one can use a more accurate perceptual model that also takes care of the luminance sensitivity and contrast masking e ect of the human visual system to nd the just noticeable di erence (JND) of each coe cient 23, 10] . Luminance sentitivity is estimated as T l (u; v; b) = T f (u; v)(X 0;0;b = X 0;0 ) a , where X 0;0;b is the DC coe cient for block b, X 0;0 is the DC coe eient corresponding to the mean luminance of the display, and a is a parameter which controls the degree of luminance sensitivity. A value of 0.649 is suggested for a in 24] . Then a contrast masking threshold, referred to as the JND, is derived as T c (u; v; b) = Max T l (u; v; b); T l (u; v; b)(jX u;v;b j=T l (u; v; b)) wu;v ], where w u;v is a number between zero and one and can assume a di erent value for each DCT basis function. A typical empirically derived value for w u;v is 0.7. Note that, in general, the JND of a coe cient increases nonlinearly with the corresponding T f (u; v) and the magnitude of the coe cient. The contrast masking e ect basically suggests that the larger the magnitude of the original coe cient, the larger amount of modi cation we can make to it without incur-ring visual artifacts. The feature set fI i g now consists of the AC coe cients which are larger than their corresponding JNDs (or equivalently, T l (u; v; b)). Note that watermarks will not be embedded into those small coe cients (smaller than their corresponding T l (u; v; b)) in order to avoid visual artifacts. This also avoids the potential negative e ect on the compression performance if JPEG compression is to be applied to the watermarked image subsequenctly.
Denote the corresponding sequence of JNDs to fI i g as fJ i g. Then J i is used as G i (I i ) in Eq. (1). This more complex watermark encoding scheme is referred to as Scheme II in the sequel. In both schemes, G i ( ) then modulates an N(0; 1) distributed pseudo random number S 1i . The resulting value is then added to I i to generate the watermarked coe cient I 0 i . Fig. 3 shows that the watermarked images by these two methods are both perceptually indistinguishable from the original image.
In our experiment, the meaningful signature S 0 is chosen as the text \Princeton University". This is just an example for choosing an owner signature. In a practical system, the user may be required to apply for an owner ID from a central authority. Then each character of \Princeton University", denoted as S 0j , j=1, 2, : : : , 19, in this case, is converted to the corresponding ASCII integer representation in the computer. For example, the character \P" ! C(P)=80, where C( ) is the conversion operator. We then use each C(S 0j ) as a seed to generate a sequence of binary i.i.d. pseudo random number fPN j i g using the program provided in UNIX machine. Then all the fPN j i g sequences are used to create another binary sequence fPN i g through logic XOR, i.e. PN i = PN 1 i PN 2 i ::: PN 19 i : (16) C(p) is then used as the seed to generate an N(0; 1) distributed sequence. Then the sign of each element is replaced with the corresponding sign of PN i . This modi ed N(0; 1) distributed sequence is then used as the fS 1i g signature. Note that, in this example, if we assume that a counterfeit attacker has analyzed the test image by playing around with the seed of a random number generator, and found a sequence fS 1i g that results in a large detector output, it is impossible for him to nd a meaningful signature S 0 (i.e., \Princeton University") that can be mapped through a one-way deterministic function to fS 1i g (or to the seed). This is especially true if it is required that this meaningful signature S 0 and/or the one-way deterministic function be aquired from a central authority. Therefore, no counterfeit scheme is possible. The detector output will truely signify the false alarm detection probability. Note that the locations of the feature set fX i g obtained from the test image may not exactly correspond to the locations of the feature set fI i g obtained from the original image, because they are determined by comparing the coe cients of the test/original image to some thresholds, and the coe cients have been changed. In addition, for the detector in Scheme II, we used the image-independent T f (u; v) as the thresholds to determine the feature set fX i g, instead of T l (u; v; b) which depends on the DC coe eient of each 8 8 block. For synchronization between the encoder and the detector without reference to the original image, the same seed will be used at the encoder and the detector to generate a random sequence, each element of which corresponds to one DCT coe cient. However, only those elements corresponding to the feature points fI i g or fX i g will be used as fS 1i g for encoding or detection. An alternative is to use all the AC coe cients of the test image as the feature points at the detector. This alternative, however, will generally yield worse performance. This can be illustrated using the following simple analysis. Suppose in the former case, the size of the feature set is n 1 . According to Eq. (5) and with the assumption that the noise N i is zero, the mean value of the output q under H 1 is
where P = P n 1 i=1 (G i (I i )S 1i S 2i ). Denote the mean value of the output q under H 1 in the latter case as m 2 . Then we have
where n 2 , which is larger than n 1 , is the size of the feature set in the latter case, and (n 1 ; ; n 2 ) are used to index those feature points of the latter case that do not belong to the feature set of the former case. Note that P n 2 i=n 1 (G i (I i )S 1i S 2i ) is approximately equal to zero, since we do not insert watermarks to those small coe cients. Therefore, the performance in the latter case is expected to be worse than the former case. This analysis, in fact, also suggests that transform domain approaches may provide some gain over spatial domain approaches because of the energy compaction property. In other words, since we know where and by how much we insert watermarks in the transform domain, we can improve the detector performace, while in the spatial domain it is usually di cult to characterize the property of the watermarks, especially when post-insertion processing is used to control the perceptual quality of the watermarked image, as was done in 1, 9] . The di erence, however, is usually not signi cant, because P n 2 i=n 1 Y 2 i (or P n 2 i=n 1 (X i S 2i ) 2 ), where fX i g; i = n 1 ; ; n 2 , correspond to small coe cients, is usually much smaller than P n 1 i=1 Y 2 i . A performance comparison will be shown in Section 4.2.
Veri cation of the distribution of q
We rst verify the distribution of the test statistic q under Hypothesis H 0 and H 1 . For H 0 , we generated 10000 di erent sequences of S 2 using di erent seeds, and then correlated them with the original image. For H 1 , we used 10000 di erent S 1 signatures to mark the original image and used corresponding correlating signatures S 2 to detect the signature. Scheme I: use B i as G i ( ) in Eq. (1) In this case, G i ( ) is independent of I i . The optimal correlating signature S 2 for e ective detection should be B i S 1i . We test three cases: S 2i = sign(S 1i ) (Case 1), S 2i = S 1i (Case 2), and S 2i = B i S 1i (Case 3). The distributions of q in both hypotheses for Case 3 are shown in Fig. 4 for the 512 512 \lenna" image. They are seen to be normal-distribution-like. Under H 1 , the mean of q is about 44.8. If the threshold T is chosen as 44.8/2, then the false alarm detection error under H 0 is virtually zero. Fig. 5 shows di erent distributions of q under H 1 for di erent choices of fS 2i g for the 512 512 \lenna" image. In Case 3 where we have the optimal S 2 , the detector output is the largest, and therefore provides the greatest robustness to signal processing. Scheme II: use J i as G i (I i ) in Eq. (1) In this case, G i (I i ) depends on I i . Therefore, the optimal correlating signature S 2 should be W i S 1i , where W i is a factor of G i (I i ) and is independent of I i . We test four cases, i.e., S 2i = sign(S 1i ) (Case 1), S 2i = S 1i (Case 2), S 2i = B i S 1i (Case 3) and S 2i = J i S 1i (Case 4). Note that in Case 3, W i , in the factorization of J i , is chosen as B i which is imageindependent. Some other small variations of the factorization are possible. However, we found in our experiments that this choice generally provided near-optimal performance. In Case 4, we use the original image to calculate J i , although an estimate based on the test image can also be used. The choice of S 2 in Case 4 may not be a strictly valid correlating signature because it depends on the original/test image. Nevertheless, it is used in our testing just for comparison purpose. In other words, the mean value of q in Case 3 is about 1.5 times of that in Case 1. It is seen that if we use S 2i = J i S 1i , then the mean value of q is much smaller than any of the other three cases. This veri es that G i (I i )S 1i is not the optimal (indeed very bad) correlating signature if G i (I i ) depends on the value of I i . It is also seen that, for corresponding cases, the distribution of q shifts to the right from Scheme I to Scheme II. This is because Scheme II inserts more watermarks than Scheme I, and thus is more robust. For the 512 512 \baboon" image, the mean values of q using Scheme II are approximately 72, 83, 98 and 67 in Cases 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively, much larger than those for the 512 512 \lenna" image. This is because \baboon" image has more high frequency components than \lenna" image, therefore we can insert more watermarks to a larger set of feature points without incurring visual artifact. The resulting watermarked image is thus more robust to common signal processing and intentional attacks.
Robustness to JPEG compression
If the test image is obtained by applying JPEG compression to the watermarked image, the output q will decrease with the JPEG quality factor Q. We rst test the robustness to JPEG compression on the 512 512 \lenna" image. Fig. 7 shows the output q as a function of the JPEG compression quality factor Q, using Scheme II as the watermark encoding scheme.
Without JPEG compression, the size of the feature set fX i g derived from the watermarked image is 62338. Thus only less than a quarter of the DCT coe cients are selected as feature points. It is seen that the detection scheme with S 2i = B i S 1i can detect the watermark with high con dence even when the watermarked image is compressed with a quality factor of 5% (compression ratio is about 43, q = 9:28, probability of false alarm detection error is in the order of 10 ?21 ). The results appear to be signi cantly better than the results reported in 1]. Given a distorted (e.g., compressed) image, we can calculate the perceptually normalized distortion (in the unit of JND) by normalizing the distortion of each DCT coe cient by the JND of that coe cient. Fig. 8 shows the perceptually normalized mean-square-error (MSE) of the JPEG compressed image as a function of the JPEG compression quality factor Q. The gure suggests that when the image is compressed with a quality factor Q less than 30% (perceptual MSE 1), the image is already visually distorted (see, Fig. 3) , and hence could not be an \original" image. In this case, the true original image, together with the detector output q, can be shown to convince the jury that the test image is a modi ed version of the original image. Fig. 9 shows that when all AC coe cients of the test image are used as feature points in the detection process, the performance is a little bit worse, as was discussed before.
For the 512 512 \baboon" image, Fig. 10 shows that the detection scheme with S 2i = B i S 1i can still detect the watermarks even when the watermarked image is compressed with a quality factor of 3% (compression ratio is about 45). This again convinces that the watermarks invisibly embedded in a more complex image can survive more severe signal processing. The small uctuation of the curve in the high Q range is probably due to the e ect of rounding errors. To study the e ect of the image size on the detection capability, we test on the 256 256 \lenna" image. Fig. 11 shows that, without JPEG compression, the detector output q is about 28.4, which is about half of the result for the 512 512 \lenna" image. This is not surprising because Eq. (3) suggests that the detector output value is linearly proportional to the square root of the number of features to which we add watermarks. Nevertheless, the detection scheme with S 2i = B i S 1i can still very reliably detect the watermarks when the watermarked image is compressed with a quality factor of 10%.
Robustness to lowpass ltering and downscaling
First of all, we should note that lowpass ltering a watermarked image will result in a blurred image (see, e.g., Fig. 12 ), which is not likely to be able to compete with the true original image for the \originality". If the lowpass ltered version of the watermarked image is downsampled and a downscaled image is obtained, this downscaled image may look perfect. However, we believe the jury will probably still favor the true original image even if they are presented with two perfect-looking images of the same content but with di erent sizes. This is because it is possible to generate a downscaled image of perfect quality from a large one, but very hard to generate a high resolution image of perfect quality from a small resolution one. In any case, we can still try to detect the watermarks by rst upsampling the downscaled image to the original size and then applying the detection. Table 2 shows the robustness of the watermarking scheme to lowpass ltering and downscaling. We use the Daubechies lter 25] with length of 4 to separately lter the watermarked images along the horizontal and vertical directions. The lowpass ltered images can be downscaled by a factor of 2 in each direction. For a downscaled image, we rst rescale it to the original size by repeating each pixel along the horizontal direction and then along the vertical direction. We can also upscale a downscaled image to the original size by inserting zero rst, and then lowpass ltering it along both the vertical and the horizontal directions.
It can be seen from Table 2 that the detector outputs much larger value when it is applied to the ltered+downscaled+upscaled image than to the lowpass-ltered-only image. It is interesting to see that the aliasing introduced by subsampling+upsampling the lowpass ltered image adds some high frequency components back, which seems to have facilitated the detection of the watermarks. Hence the detector can work better on this l- tered+downscaled+upscaled image than on the lowpass-ltered-only image. In general, the detector can successfully detect the watermarks in a downscaled image. It is also seen when the same lowpass lter is used to upscale a downscaled image by inserting zero rst and then lowpass ltering, the detector outputs higher values than when upscaling is realized by simple pixel repetition. However, we should note that this lowpass lter used by an attacker should be assumed to be unknown to the true owner. One possible way to improve the detector performance is to try di erent lters in the upsampling process. Hopefully some lters will result in larger detector outpout values. An alternative is to try to estimate the potential transformation that has been applied to the watermarked image (by making use of the original image), and then use that information to improve the detector performance, as was discussed in 11]. Table 2 shows the detector can detect the watermarks in the lowpass ltered 512 512 \lenna" and 512 512 \baboon" images. The detector output is relatively low for the lowpass ltered 256 256 \lenna" image. However, in that case, we can deliberately downscale the image and then rescale it to the original size, then apply the detection scheme. The output now is much larger and should be a good indication of the existence of the embedded watermarks.
It is worthwhile to point out that, with the constraint of not using the original image in the detection process, the robustness to signal processing is generally weaker than in the (19) Therefore the V y here could potentially be much smaller than the V y in the former case, and one hence has a higher output statistic q (see Eq. (5)). For example, for the 512 512 watermarked \lenna" image (using Scheme II for encoding), the detector of 10] which uses the original image outputs the values of 281, 59, 28 and 12.1 (compared to the results in Fig. 7 where the original image is not used for detection), when applied to JPEG compressed watermarked images with quality factor Q of 100%, 20%, 10% and 5%, respectively. Fortunately, for resolving rightful ownership, the more severe the test image is distorted (in order to remove the watermarks), the more likely the jury will favor the true owner who has a perfect looking original image (vs. the attacker's low quality image). In this sense, we believe the robustness requirement is not as stringent as in other applications such as using watermarks to identify the illegal distributors. For similar reasons, we do not present the results for testing the robustness of the watermarking scheme to cropping of an image, and to the operation of printing out the watermarked image and rescanning it in. Nevertheless, we believe that it is reasonable to use the original image indirectly, e.g., in the process of registering the test image with the correlating signature. Furthermore, once the original image is not questionable, e.g., for applications of identifying the illegal distributors, it can be used in the watermark detection process to enhance the detection capability. Therefore, with the same watermarks inserted, the detection scheme can di er, depending on the applications.
Conclusions
This paper rst identi es the key problems existing in many current watermarking schemes regarding resolving the rightful ownership of an image. We show that, for the particular application of resolving rightful ownership using invisible watermarks, the original image should not be directly involved in the watermark detection process. Some other requirements on the claimed watermark sequence are also identi ed and discussed. We believe that, for a valid claim of ownership, it is necessary to require that the claimed watermark sequence be generated from some meaningful signature or registered owner ID through a potentially certi ed one-way deterministic function. A statistical technique for validly and e ectively detecting the invisible watermarks is then proposed. This technique is able to quantify the con dence of the detection based on the measure of false alarm detection probability. The optimal detection strategy within this framework is analyzed. It is shown that, when combined with some visual-model-based watermark encoding schemes, this technique is generally robust enough for resolving the dispute of rightful ownership.
